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2	BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON		
3	ALBERT E. DEATLEY and IVA) DEATLEY,)		
4	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		
5	Appellants,) SHB Nos. 89-3 & 90-17)		
6	v.)		
7	YAKIMA COUNTY, GEORGE AND RUTH) ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL NEWLAND (YAKIMA CONCRETE AND) SUMMARY JUDGMENT ASPHALT COMPANY), and State of)		
8	Washington DEPARTMENT OF) ECOLOGY,)		
9	Respondents.)		
11			
12	On November 21, 1988 Yakima County issued shoreline substantial		
ور 13	development, variance and conditional use permits for a concrete batch		
14	plant, asphalt plant, permanent offices and shop facility, and surface		
15	mining operations along the Yakima River. On December 29, 1988 the		
16	Department of Ecology (DOE) approved the permits. An appeal was filed		
17	with the Shorelines Hearings Board (SHB), which became SHB No. 89-3.		
18	DOE certified the appeal on January 31, 1989.		
19	After motions practice, the Board dismissed the appeal for lack		
20	of standing. Thurston County Superior Court reversed the dismissal		
21	and remanded the appeal to the Board.		
22	On March 22, 1990, Yakima County issued a revision to the		
23	shoreline substantial development and conditional use permits,		
24	removing requirements for elevating structures. Appellants filed a		
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(1)

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHB Nos. 89-3 & 90-17

1 request for review with the SHB on April 2, 1990, which became SHB No. 2 90-17. DOE certified the appeal on May 11, 1990. 3 The Board consolidated the two appeals. 4 On April 30, 1990 a prehearing conference was held which all 5 parties attended. As a result, a Pre-hearing Order was issued May 4, 6 1990, listing the legal issues, scheduling the hearing on the merits 7 for November 13-16, 1990, specifiying interim dates, and so forth. 8 These legal issues were supplemented, without opposition, by 9 respondent Newlands' filing on May 11, 1990 and by appellants' filing 10 on May 21, 1990. 11 The Board has also considered the following filings with 12 attachments: 13 14 Respondent Newlands' Motion, Memorandum in Support of Motion to 1. Dismiss (8/30); 15 Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgement (9/21);. 2. 3. Appellants' Responsive Brief for Dismissal (9/20); 16 Respondent Newlands' Brief Opposing S/J (10/4); 4. Respondent Newlands' Supplemental Brief Opposing S/J (10/4); 5. 17 Respondent Yakima County's Memo Opposing S/J (10/4); 6. 7. For appellants, affidavit of Robert Rowley (10/4); 18 8. Appellants' Response to Motion to Strike and Responding to Supplemental Material (10/4); 19 9. Appellants' Reply Brief on S/J (10/5/90); For respondent Newlands' affidavit of Richard F. Anderwald. 10. 20 21 Having considered the foregoing, and having deliberated, the Board 22 issues these: 23 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 24 Τ 25 Disputed issues of material fact exist as to respondent Newlands' 26 ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 27

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SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHB Nos. 89-3 & 90-17

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motion for dismissal and appellants' motion for summary judgment.

Therefore, both these motions are DENIED.

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The filings that have been made, however, have transformed respondent Newlands' motion to one for summary judgment. Superior Court Civil Rule 12. Opportunity to present pertinent material has been afforded.

III

The Shoreline Hearings Board does not have jurisdiction to require Yakima County at this juncture to seek enforcement action. However, the Board as a factual matter can consider whether the permittees have been operating under a pre-existing permit and whether it remains in effect, has been superceded, and so forth. Such material facts are in dispute.

IV

The Board does not have jurisdiction to determine the facial validity of the Yakima County Shoreline Master Program. However, the Board has jurisdiction to consider the Program as applied.

V

We conclude that the proper official did act on behalf of the County in the SEPA process. It is unrefuted that the County had contracted with this individual to perform as a SEPA official.

VI

An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was done. Therefore, the legal issue on offering a mitigated DNS is moot. Similarly, SEPA

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Checklist issues are cured by the issuance and circulation of an EIS, and are therefore moot.

VII

The Board's de novo proceedings provide adequate procedural safeguards, and we, therefore, decline to resolve the appearance of fairness issue. Washington Environmental Council v. Douglas County, Department of Transportation, et al., SHB No. 86-34.

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHB Nos. 89-3 & 90-17

ORDER Respondent Newlands' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. Partial Summary Judgment for Respondent is GRANTED in conformance with this opinion. DONE this 2 day of November, 1990. SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD S. McGEE, Member NANCY BURNETT, Member STEVEN W. MORRISON, Member

0	BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON		
2 3	ALBERT E. DEATLEY and IVA)		
4	DEATLEY,)		
5	Appellants,) SHB No. 89-3		
6	V.) ORDER DENYING REQUEST THE COUNTY OF YAKIMA, GEORGE) FOR RECONSIDERATION		
7	THE COUNTY OF YAKIMA, GEORGE) FOR RECONSIDERATION NEWLAND, RUTH NEWLAND, and) YAKIMA CONCRETE AND ASPHALT)		
8	COMPANY,)		
9	Respondents.)		
10	·		
11	On April 6, 1989, Attorney Robert C. Rowley, representing		
12	appellants Deatley, filed a Petition to Reconsider the Board's final		
10	Order in this matter. Responses and replies of the parties were filed		
7-7	thereafter.		
15	Having considered the request and having reviewed the file and		
16	record herein and being fully advised		
17	NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the request for reconsideration		
18	DONE at Lacey, Washington, this 16th day of May, 1989.		
19	DONE at Lacey, washington, this /- day of /2 / , 1989.		
20	SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD		
21	WICK DUFRORD, Chairman		
22	(See Dissent)		
23	JUDITH A. BENDOR, Member		
25	HAROLD S. ZIMMERMAN, Memoer		
20	naux Bunt		
27 (NANCY BURNETT, Member		
-• (PAUL CYR, Member		

BEFORE THE SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD 1 STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 ALBERT E. and IVA DEATLEY, 3 Appellants, SHB No. 89-3 4 5 YAKIMA COUNTY; GEORGE and RUTH ORDER GRANTING NEWLAND; and YAKIMA CONCRETE MOTION TO DISMISS 6 AND ASPHALT COMPANY, 7 Respondents. 3

The matter involves the Request for Review of the approval of a concrete batch plant and permanent office and shop facility, and to qualify an existing surface mining operation including erection of a 75 foot high concrete plant and a 40 foot high asphalt plant within the shoreline of the Yakima River.

Yakima County issued a substantial development/variance/conditional use permit to George and Ruth Newland on November 21, 1988. The Department of Ecology approved the permit

S F No 9928-OS-8-67

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on December 29, 1988. On January 25, 1989, the Request for Review was received by the Shorelines Hearings Board. On February 6, 1989, the Board received from the Department of Ecology and Attorney General a certification that the "requestor has valid reasons to seek review prusuant to RCW 90.58.180(1)."

On February 15, 1989, Yakima Concrete and Asphalt Company filed a Motion to Dismiss. Oral argument was heard by telephone conference on March 3, 1989. Supplemental submissions from appellants were received on March 9, 1989.

In this matter, appellants Deatley were represented by Robert C. Rowley, Attorney at Law. Respondents Newland and Yakima Concrete Asphalt Company were represented by G. Scott Beyer, Attorney at Law. Terry Austin, Deputy Prosecutor, represented Yakima County.

The arguments were heard and the record reviewed by the Board, Wick Dufford (Presiding), Judith A. Bendor, Harold S. Zimmerman, Nancy Burnett and Paul Cyr, Members. The Board announced its decision to the parties orally on March 10, 1989. This Order memorializes that decision.

Ι

In reaching its decision, the Board considers the following:

- 1. Request for Review (Yakima County File No. SH 87-9), with attached exhibits;
 - 2. Respondent Yakima Concrete and Asphalt Company's Motion to

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS SHB No. 89-3

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26	ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
27	CHB NO 80-3

- randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion ss:
- davit of Fred C. Hobbs; and
- eline Management Substantial Development, Conditional Variance Permit (File No. SH 87-9), signed 21, 1988.
- ntal Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support ss;
- er's Memorandum in Opposition to Dismissal Motion, Petitioner (Albert E. Deatley) Opposing Motion to
- um of Yakima County in Support of Respondent Yakima to Dismiss, with Affidavit of Tom Durant; and
- ts') Supplemental Legal Memorandum (Reply to Yakıma m, with Affidavit (Robert C. Rowley, counsel) nt Affidavit.

ΙI

project is located at the Newlands' gravel pit site 4 between the Yakima River and Riverside Road within of the Yakıma River. Yakima Concrete and Asphalt e Newland site to be used for batching concrete and

Albert E. Deatley is an owner of Superior Asphalt and Concrete Company which produces, sells and paves asphalt. Superior Asphalt and Concrete Company's plant is approximately one and one-half miles from the Newland pit site. Albert E. and Iva Deatley's residence is approximately eight miles from the Newland site.

The Newland site is located within the Yakıma River Greenway, a conservation area established in 1977. Yakıma Concrete and Asphalt Company's production, sale and paving of asphalt, resulting from operations under the permit would be in direct competition with the business of Superior Asphalt and Concrete Company.

III

In seeking dismissal, movants assert that a) the appeal was filed too late, b) that lack of comment by the Deatleys on the challenged environmental documents forecloses review of the environmental analysis under the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), and c) that appellants lack standing to obtain review before the Shorelines Hearings Board.

ΙV

We conclude that appellants lack standing and therefore do not reach the alternative bases asserted.

Under RCW 90.58.180(1) review of shorelines permit decisions may be obtained by "any person aggrieved". The same "person aggrieved" standard governs review of SEPA issues. RCW 43.21C.075(4).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS SHE No. 89-3

MOTION TO DISMISS SHB No. 89-3

ORDER GRANTING

Standing under this formulation requires injury in fact to interests arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statutes involved. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and the Board's prior decisions in Foulks v. King County, SHB 80-17 and Hildahl v. Stellacoom, SHB 80-33.

v

Albert Deatley's affidavit asserts concerns for economic impacts, local government processes and for the effect of the project on the Greenway. Of these, only the Greenway concern might fall within the zone of interests protected by SEPA. His affidavit merely recites his support for the Greenway and Greenway Foundation.

As the the SEPA issues raised, we hold that appellants have failed to present sufficient evidentiary facts to show they will suffer injury in fact to a personal environmental interest. Concerned Olympia Residents v. Olympia, 33 Wn App. 677, 657 P.2d 790 (1983); Coughlin v. Seattle School District, 27 Wn. App. 888; 621 P.2d 183 (1980).

VI

The shorelines issues involve a somewhat different zone of interests. The Shoreline Management Act (SMA) is a land use law protective of interests in property as well as environmental interests. See RCW 90.58.020.

As to shorelines issues, we hold that appellants have failed again to present sufficient evidentiary facts to show they will suffer injury in fact to interests protected by the statute.

Appellants have demonstrated no interference with the use and enjoyment of their property or their use and enjoyment of the shoreline. The most Deatley's affidavit demonstrates is possible impact on his business through competition. We do not believe the SMA is intended to regulate business competition.

Appellants' assertions of interest in local government processes reflect no impacts different in kind or severity from that experienced by members of the regulated community generally. Deatley has not shown an individualized personal stake in this subject. See Coughlin, supra.

VII

In addition to traditional standing analysis, this Board in the past has also relied on the certification of the Department of Ecology and Attorney General as a basis for standing. See Foulks and Hildahl, supra.

We take this occasion to reject that approach and overrule our prior decisions to the extent they hold that certification under RCW 90.58.180(1) confers standing.

It is apparent to us that the review conducted to perform the screening necessary to certify "that the requestor has valid reasons

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS SHB No. 89-3

27 | SHB No. 89-3

not involve an evaluation of the standing issue. In the instant case there is nothing in the Request for Review from which standing could be inferred.

VIII

to see review" does not look behind the face of the pleadings and does

The Request for Review is brought to seek review by the Shorelines Hearings Board of the granting of a shorelines permits issued under RCW 90.58.140. SEPA is supplementary to the SMA. RCW 43.21C.060. Absent standing to raise issues under these statutes, there is no basis for the Board to exercise jurisdiction over the ancillary issues raised with respect to the Greenway Act and the appearance of fairness doctrine.

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO DISMISS

(7)

ORDER

The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Because appellants lack standing the Board is without power to adjudicate their claims. DONE this 30th day of March, 1989.

SHORELINES HEARINGS BOARD

Wick Dufford, Chairman

Judith A Bendor, Member

Harold S. Zimmerman, Member

Nancy Burnett Member

Paul Cyr by William a Harrison

27 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMIS

BENDOR: DISSENTING OPINION

I respectfully dissent.

The legislature enacted the Shoreline Management Act (SMA), stating that the Act:

shall be liberally construed to give full effect to the objectives and pruposes for which it was enacted. RCW 90.58.900.

The SMA also provides that:

Any person aggrieved by the granting, denying, or rescinding of a permit on shorelines of the state . . . may seek review from the shoreline hearings board . . . RCW 90.58.180(1).

The State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) similarly provides that when linked to a specific governmental action a "person aggrieved" can appeal determination of SEPA compliance. RCW 43.21C.075(1) and (4).

Both statutes' purposes include protection of the environment. Such basic goals "become as dust" if a person's standing to challenge governmental action is given a cramped, arid reading. Unfortunately, that is the case with my colleagues' order denying reconsideration.

Appellant's filings now clearly show that he is "a person aggrieved". Appellant Albert E. Deatley is a long-time resident of Yakıma County. Affidavit Opposing Dismissal, at p. 2. Mr. Deatley

In a hearing on the merits, the SMA covers consideration of the access to the shoreline and questions of private property. This proceeding, however, is a summary proceeding on standing, not on the merits.

states:

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I have conducted activities upon the shorelines of the Yakima river and intend to do so in the future. Affidavit, at p. 2.

The proposed concrete batch/asphalt plant's other facilities and surface mining operation are within the shorelines of the Yakima River.

These facts were insufficient to prevent dismissal, as appellant had failed to state injuries within the zones of interest protected by the statutes.

In unanimously granting dismissal, SHB announced a new rule, holding that DOE certification of an appeal alone was not a sufficient basis to confer standing. Order of Dismissal, March 20, 1989, at p. 6. To the extent that previous SHB cases held otherwise, they were explicitly overruled. Order Dismissing, supra, overruling in part:

Foulks v. King County, SHB 80-17; and Hildahl v. Steilacoom, SHB 80-33.

Since appellant had relied on these cases in substantial measure in resisting the Motion to Dismissal, it is not surprising that his subsequent Affidavit in Support of Reconsideration contained additional facts.²

If credibility were an issue, that, of course, cannot be decided by reliance on affidavits. It would necessitate a hearing on that issue. Neither the Board's original unanimous Order of Dismissal, nor the cryptic Order Denying Reconsideration address credibility. It can be observed that when parties make extensive filings and argument, the small kernel of relevant facts can sometimes be lost "midst the blast".

That affidavit states in pertinent part:

[. . .] I became a supporter of the Greenway concept and favored preservation of the wetlands. I, my wife, and children all utilize and enjoy the Greenway facilities. Since that date, additional expansion of the Geenway has occurred from Terrace Heights Drive on the south to Selah Gap on the north. The next phase for development of the Greenway is southward across SR 24 to Union Gap on the south. The applicant's property and the site immediately to the south prevent any additional growth of the Greenway Park southerly on the east bank of the river, which is the prime natural habitat still existing. The west side of the river is almost completely devegetated and urbanized. [Page 5]

[. . .] I want the county to protect the environment, assure a safe intersection, and encourage development of the Greenway. I have a very high personal stake and a business stake in seeing to it that it does not trade off those worthwhile and often stated goals, especially when I have such a large personal and financial commitment involved. I know that if the shoreline Board does not do something about correcting this permit decision that the Yakima River environment will be forever changed adversely and unnecessarily. . . [Page 8; Emphasis added]

The Draft EIS, (at Fig. 5, attached), filed on April 24, 1989, makes clear the project is within the Yakima Greenway Boundary.

When both affidavits are considered together with Figure 5, appellant has shown

'a personal stake' in the outcome of the controversy, so that 'the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). This is in contrast to 'a mere interest in the problem.' United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). Foulks, supra, at pp. 5-6.

DISSENTING OPINON - BENDOR SHB No. 89-3

(3)

See also, Coughlin v. Seattle School District, 27 Wn. App. 888, 621 P.2d 183 (1980). Concerned Olympia Residents v. Olympia, 33 Wn. App. 677, 657 P.2d 790 (1983). The threat of a specific injury has been shown. SAVE v. Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 675 P.2d 401 (1978). The proposed concrete/asphalt plants and mining threaten appellant's recreational use and enjoyment of the shoreline. See, SAVE, supra; Hildahl v. Stellacoom, supra, at pp. 9-10.

I conclude that the record taken as a whole demonstrates standing. The Motion to Reconsider should be GRANTED.

JUDITH A. BENDOR, Member

Attach: Fig. 5 from draft EIS

DISSENTING OPINON - BENDOR

